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THE BACKLOG: BARBARA'S ACHILLES HEEL? 
Barbara McDougall, our Minister of 
Employment and Immigration, has 
managed a brilliant balancing ad. She 
has raised the immigration plan to 
250,000 per year without arousing a 
massive backlash. She has refused to 
introduce the draconian and unworkable 
provision for turning back refugee 
claimants amving from countries where 
they sojourned for more than 48 hours 
and where they theoretically could have 
made a refugee claim. The new refugee 
determination system is sputtering 
along in spite of the slow pace of reform, 
many inexperienced refugee lawyers 
and the large number of claimants. 
Is Barbara's Achilles heel the 
backlog, those refugee claims dating 
back two and more years prior to the 
introduction of the new system? The 
Interchurch Committee claimed, in its 
brief to the United Nations Committee 
on Human Rights, that there are 101,853 
cases in the backlog and 122,223 affected 
individuals, though the department 
operates on the assumption, for planning 
purposes, that there are still only 85,000 
cases because that is the number for 
which the department was funded. The 
irony may be that, in fact, the latter is 
close to the correct figure because of poor 
departmental record keeping - double 
counting, including old files in the 
estimates, etc. We will use theestimate of 
85,000 cases. 
On December 28, 1988, Barbara 
announced that she was launching a two 
year plan to clear up the refugee claims 
backlog through a case-bycase hearing 
system to determine which claimants 
were credible or had humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds to be allowed to 
remain. The backlog was supposed to 
have been cleared up by the end of 
December 1990. As of the end of 
October 1990, there are still 58,432 
undecided cases. By September of 1991, 
the revised deadline for clearing up the 
backlog, will the task be done? 
To the end of October 31,1990, only 
167 individuals have actually been 
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deported. The reason that only 167 of 
1,121 cases have been deported is a 
comment on the complicated 
bureaucracy needed to remove people 
fromcanada. Only595of the 1,121 cases 
that received negative decisions have 
received their removal order; 526 are 
pending. Of the 595,315 are waiting for 
a review, and only 280 cases have been 
ordered deported. Between that order 
and making the actual arrangements - 
visas, transport, escorts, etc. - there are 
additional delays. The costs of deporting 
each individual is, therefore, very high. 
The cost of clearing up the backlog in two 
years was estimated at just over $114, 
000,000. Add to that the estimated costs 
of actual deportation not included in this 
figure of $3,200 per deportee on average. 
The deportation total is projected to 
reach 217 by the end of the year. Using 
the costs for processing only, the 
expenses for deportation to the end of 
1990 will be $ll4,2OllOOO + (217 x $3,200) 
= approx. $115,000,000, over one half 
million dollars per deportee. Even if the 
2,936 confirmed voluntary departures 
are thrown into the total, an estimated 
3,246 by the end of 1990, the cost is about 
$33,000 per case. 
A Parliamentary Committee 
estimated that the clearance, at the rate 
then being processed, would take over 6 
years at a processing rate of 13,000 cases 
per year at full strength, and could cost 
over half a billiondollars, almost as much 
as the UNHCR receives in a year to 
support 15 million refugees around the 
world 
The speeded up paper processing 
started in the summer of 1990 will 
undoubtedly reduce the period to clear 
the backlog, but will it enable the 
September 1991 revised target to come 
close to being met? Before we look at the 
actual figures processed in the last two 
months, it is important to understand 
that the backlog cases are being handled 
The new refugee 
determination system 
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o f  refom, . . . 
in different streams. The backlog 
includes those cases which had been 
opened already under the old system, 
prior to the new legislation. An 
estimated 30,000 cases have had an 
examination under oath and even a 
hearing. These cases are being reviewed 
at headquarters. 5,637 to the end of 
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October have been determined to have 
passed the credible basis test and have 
been given landed status. Of the balance 
that have gone to a hearing and been 
decided, 1815 have been accepted, 680 
have been rejected and the rest are 
waiting for a determination of their 
cases. Inother words, for30% of the total 
case load (30,000 of 85,000 cases), 30% of 
the cases have been processed to the end 
of October (8,132 of 26,568) by means of 
a paper review. This does not auger well 
for the promise that the cases will all 
have been processed by September of 
1991. 
There is another peculiarity when 
we examine the figures from this oldest 
set of cases. They constitute 30% of the 
total case load. But they contain 37.5% of 
those accepted (5,637 + 1,815 of 19,845) 
and a startling 60% of those rejected, 
which initially seems surprising since 
most of the 30,000 were believed to come 
from refugee producing countries. But 
all it means is that of the balance of the 
other cases, a much higher proportion 
have agreed to leave Canada voluntarily. 
Of the balance of the 55,000 "new" 
cases, the vast majority of the files have 
not been opened. Those claimants are 
being asked to fill out long 
questionnaires for a paper process. In 
Montreal, by the end of December, kits 
will have been sent to every claimant to 
complete the new forms and all the files 
are expected to be opened. In Toronto 
and Mississauga, with well over 50% of 
the case load, all the files will not be 
opened by the end of December, but all 
are expected to receive them by the 
spring of 1991. The claimants will have 
6-8 weeks to complete the questionnaires 
and department officials estimate that it 
will take another 2 - 3 months to provide 
a paper review of the cases. The 
claimants are subdivided into two 
streams, those the department intends to 
But the most startling 
figure is the large numbers 
going underground. 33% 
to 50% are not leaving 
anyway and those 
proportions are increasing 
dramatically 
concede and those who will be given a 
hearing - those cases which the 
department intends to contest. The 
critical issue is not how many files are 
opened, but how many will be processed 
under the speeded up paper review. 
Since the paper review was only initiated 
in the summer, we cannot expect any 
results until the beginning of 1991 so we 
have no way of knowing whether the 
speeded up paper process will enable the 
job to be completed by September. 
Nevertheless, a close examination 
of the statistics to date are veryrevealing. 
The actual number of cases being 
processed has increased, but not 
significantly. At the October rate, it will 
still take almost three more years to clear 
the backlog. However, if the paper 
processing works as planned, and one 
has every reason to be sceptical about 
this, the real problem in the system may 
be elsewhere. Of the total number of 
cases, extrapolating from the present, the 
whole process will result in at most 3,700 
negative decisions. Adding voluntary 
departures will add at most another 7,700 
cases. In other words, to get rid of at most 
11,000 cases, 13% of the total, we are 
going to spend $170,000,000 in 
processing costs and a further estimated 
$30,000,000 in direct deportation 
charges, or about $40,000 per each person 
deported. If the voluntary departures 
are factored in, the cost for every 
individual made to leave is almost 
$15,000 per case. All this assumes that 
the program canbe completed by the end 
of 1991 and, if it cannot, the costs go up 
proportionately. 
But the most startling figure is the 
large numbers going underground. 33% 
to 50% are not leaving anyway and those 
proportions are increasing 
dramatically. The explanation for the 
dramatic rise in this figure may be found 
by looking more closely at the voluntary 
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departure figure. Of the 2936 confirmed 
departures to the end of October, 1750 of 
them were Portuguese, 60% of the total. 
There were 4,066 in the backlog and that 
large a number were unable to obtain 
bookings back to Portugal in the busy 
travel period. When the Portuguese who 
are voluntarily leaving have all returned 
to Portugal, the proportions of voluntary 
departures can be expected to drop 
dramatically and the numbers that will 
go underground can be expected to 
increase beyond the proportions and 
numbers projected. We can anticipate a 
class of at least 18,000 illegals living 
underground. 
Is the process worth it? I originally 
supported Barbara's attempt to balance 
humanitarian concerns, authentic 
'refugee determination and deterrence 
for clearly abusive cases. I thought a 
liberal and speedy process for 
adjudicating the refugee claims in the 
backlog tempered by a humanitarian 
concern for some of the others and 
deportation for abusers without 
humanitarian mitigating factors would 
set a proper balance. Whether or not I 
was wrong at the time, is it correct to 
continue such support under the present 
circumstances? 
There is a campaign being 
organized at the present time by the 
refugee support community for an 
amnesty. Clearly, these groups are not 
supporters of those who abuse the 
refugee system to jump from the 
immigration queue. It jeopardizes the 
refugee system and creates extra work 
for them. Is the call for an amnesty 
warranted? 
Why have they urged an amnesty? 
Because the system is inhumane. 
Because in the defense of the rule of law, 
. the law is being abused. Because rather 
than deterring future abusers, the 
method of dealing with the backlog is 
setting the stage for future abuse. 
It is not necessary to go into the 
history of the backlog, but it does help to 
know that the amnesty introduced to be 
the last one ever was done so before a 
new system was in place to deter new 
abusers. In fact Bill C-55 was not even 
tabled until 8 months after the amnesty. 
At the time there was widespread 
suspicion that the flood of abusers who 
took advantage of the window of 
opportunity were part of the dramatic 
scare tactics to drum up public support 
for Bill C-55, particularly the draconian 
measure of the safe third country option 
which would have prevented most 
legitimate refugee claimants from ever 
having the opportunity to make a 
refugee claim in Canada. In any case, the 
situation is dramatically different at the 
present time. A new systemisin place. It 
is not being abused by a flood of 
manifestly unfounded claims. The 
suffering the individuals have endured 
in the backlog is more than enough to 
have deterred abusers in the future. 
The arguments for those urging 
amnesty can be summarized easily. 
If, in order to deal with abusers, 
An Ontario court has 
ruled that justice delayed 
more than 18 months is 
unjust. In the case of the 
backlog, the justice delayed 
for many in the system has 
been three, four and f i e  
years. 
genuine refugees are made to suffer 
further misery by being pushed to the 
back of the line, the cost is much too high. 
If, in order to uphold the abstract rule of 
law, we break our own laws in the 
process, the cost is much too high. If we 
rewrite history and blame the previous 
amnesty for the subsequent abuse, the 
cost is much too high. If after years and 
years in the backlog, it takes another year 
for a claimant to get landed and at least a 
further year to be reunited with their 
immediate families, disregarding for the 
moment the risk to torture and abuse of 
the relatives of genuine refugee 
claimants in the backlog, the cost to that 
family is much too high. When the 
dedicated and underpaid workers in our 
ISAP agencies who deliver immigrant 
aid services to immigrants and refugees 
have their work loads clogged up with 
those in the backlog, the costs are much 
too high. 
Are these arguments convincing? 
It is fair to say that Barbara is, I 
believe, genuinely concerned with 
separating out fair treatment for genuine 
refugee claimants while providing 
strong deterrence for abusers. Barbara is 
certainly concerned with upholding the 
rule of law and seeing that abusers are 
not rewarded for jumping the queue. 
Barbara does not want to set a precedent 
with another amnesty which might 
encourage future abuse. 
But is this the way to go about it? 
Judge Jerome had to rule that the system 
violated our own law demanding 
humanitarian treatment. The systemhas 
not developed a common standard of 
treatment. It is beset by arbitrariness and 
the requirement that humanitarian 
considerations govern the process. No 
one who is at all acquainted with the 
degree of suffering of those in the 
backlog can make any claim for 
humanitarian consideration. The 
suffering has now been documented, not 
only by the Interchurch Committee in 
Toronto, which can be accused of having 
its own bleeding heart to mollify, but by 
an independent research institute at the 
Universitk de Quebec, Le Laboratoire de 
Recherche en Ecologie Humaine et 
M a l e  (Le LAREHS). The depression, 
anxiety, loneliness, sleeplessness, 
nightmares and psychosomatic 
symptoms that pervade not only the 
abusers but the genuine refugee 
claimants waiting years in the backlog 
stream can justly be labelled cruel and 
inhuman punishment for those who 
abused the system and totally 
unwarranted for those trapped by our 
own mistakes. 
An Ontario court has ruled that 
justice delayed more than 18 months is 
unjust. In the case of the backlog, the 
justice delayed for many in the system 
has been three, four and five years. The 
United Nations Committee for Human 
Rights could rule that Canada, a leader in 
the defence of human rights, has indeed 
abused the rights of those in the backlog 
according to Article 2 requiring effective 
remedies for abuse, Article 7 which 
prohibits cruel and inhuman treatment, 
Article 23 demanding protection of the 
family and Article 26 demanding equal 
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treatment before the law in accordance 
with the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. 
The government held its nose when 
13,000 Poles used the opportunity of the 
self-exiled class provisions (before that 
class was eliminated) to enter Canada as 
refugees When Poland was no longer, 
and had not been for some time, a refugee 
producing country. We allowed them to 
"abuse" the principle of the system if not 
Now is the time to reverse 
ourselves befme we dig 
ourselves in deeper. 
the law. We cannot claim purity in either 
our motives, procedures or conduct to 
justify standing on the high horse of 
principle and, at the same time, 
perpetuating unnecessary suffering. 
And the costs of upholding principles 
which are already seriously 
compromised are enormous. If we add 
to these factors thevery high cost for each 
case actually deported, the very high 
numbers that will enter the illegal 
underground in Canada and the very 
doubtful projection that the process can 
ever be completed by the end of 1991, it is 
very difficult to continue supporting the 
present system. However, if an amnesty 
is offered now, there is a further 
complication. Some will have been 
deported while if you got into the stream 
much later, you will have earned an 
amnesty. It just would not be fair; 
But only 167 have been deported to 
the end of October and about 200 cases 
will only have been deported by the end 
of 1990. Now is the time to reverse 
ourselves before we dig ourselves in 
deeper. I now urge the Tory government 
and Barbara to change the stubborn 
defence of the present method of dealing 
with the backlog. El 
(Howard Adelman is a Professor of 
Philosophy at York University and directs 
the Centre for Refugee Studies, a research 
centre focused on rqfugees which was recently 
recognized by the Government of Canada as 
a Centre of Excellence. ) 
IF YOU LOVE, THEN HAVE COMPASSION ... 
Fr. Olivier Morin S J, 
Jesuit Refugee Sentice, Toronto 
For four and a half years I have been 
serving Vietnamese refugees in the camp 
m Southeast Asia: a year on Pulau 
Bidong, in Malaysia, and three and a half 
years at Phanat Nikhom in Thailand. 
During this period, the situation has 
:hanged in the camps, principally 
because of the decision taken that 
Vietnamese who have arrived after 14th 
March, 1989, will not be recognized as 
"refugees", but will only be known as 
"asylum seekers". 
Whatever my own opinion about 
the moral and humanitarian value of 
such a decision, I am forced to accept it as 
a fact and to assess the consequences. 
Nothing can allow us to think seriously 
that this decision will be reconsidered. 
On the contrary new events, such as the 
significant migration from East Europe, 
for example, can but reinforce it. 
From this decision several 
consequences have followed: 
1. A very small number of asylum 
seekers (between 10% and 16%), who 
have documentation proving they have 
suffered persecution or that their lives 
were threatened, have been recognized 
by the ad hoc commission (they are 
'screened in') and can seek to be accepted 
in a third country. Minors who have 
their father or mother in a third country 
maybe screened in, but a sponsorship by 
a brother, uncle or friend helps no one. 
2. The great majority do not possess 
such documents or cannot substantiate 
their claims and so are rejected ('screened 
out'). 
a) From the moment of arrival in the 
camp, some know very well that they 
have no chance, and rather than wait 
long months in difficult conditions they 
prefer to accept the evidence and request 
'voluntary repatriation'. But they must 
present themselves to a Vietnamese gov- 
ernment delegation, and this is an obsta- 
cle that diminishes their desire to return 
to Vietnam. What are the guarantees? 
Even the UNHCR is vague on this point. 
b) Some, hoping against all hope, 
want to try their luck and wait their turn 
to be screened. This is a very 
slowprocess. The recent arrivals will 
wait one or even two years if nothing is 
done to speed up the pace. They can also 
appeal against an unfavourable decision, 
but the results are negligible. After all 
this they will still be in a hopeless 
situation and caught in the severity of 
camp life. 
C) Finally, there is a group who do 
not actually request voluntary 
repatriation, but who have not formally 
opposed a return, so the first asylum 
country decides to send them back. This 
group is not normally required to go 
before the Vietnamese delegation. They 
may feel unlucky, but they do not lose 
face. They are something like those who 
missed the boat before it left the beach. 
Having lived at Phanat Nikhom and 
followed this matter quite closely my 
personal convictions are as follows: 
Nothing, absolutely nothing can 
persuade me that the date limit of 14 
March, 1989, will be lifted. So our 
responsibility is considerable, and what 
possible considerations are there that can 
allow us to say: "maintain your refusal". 
We are playing with human lives if we 
insist on such a position. It would be 
wrong for us to propose our wishes 
(which are easy to voice from the 
freedom of our new countries), if they 
conflict with the reality. 
In such a situation we have no 
right to encourage falsehopes. The truth, 
however painful it may be, must be 
spoken, otherwise we are responsible for 
the (possible) desperate actions that 
asylum seekers take when they have 
been misled even by those who wish to 
help them 
The approach mentioned in (c), 
above, may offer one possible way 
forward, particularly if we can offer 
some solidarity to those sent back. It 
avoids the humiliation of having to 
publicly admit to failure. Another 
problem is that in order to leave, the 
Vietnamese have sold everything, thus 
their return is made even more difficult 
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